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AIDS AND GOVERNMENT: 
A PLAN OF ACTION? 
Taunya Lovell Banks* 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IM-
MUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1988. Pp. xix, 201. $11. 
A recent New York Times article noted that "[a]mong the changes 
wrought during the Reagan years, few may turn out to be so profound 
and irreversible as the reshaping of health care."1 Now more than 
ever before, budgetary considerations significantly constrain major 
health care decisions.2 Yet in contrast to the Reagan administration's 
usual miserly attitude on health care spending, the final Report of the 
Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epi-
demic argues that as much as $3 billion must be spent annually over 
the next ten years if the epidemic is to be stemmed (p. 171). President 
Reagan's final AIDS budget request for fiscal year 1990 was $1.4 bil-
lion short, although the Office of Management and Budget estimates 
that $2.1 billion will be spent on AIDS in fiscal year 1990.3 Indeed, 
the obstacles to success identified by the report reflect a far broader 
failure on the part of American society to provide adequate access to 
health care for the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and individuals 
with chronic diseases. Not surprisingly, the Commission chair, in a 
portion of the draft unfortunately omitted from the final commission 
report, calls for a revamping of this country's health care delivery 
system.4 
• Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. B.A. 1965, Syracuse University; J.D. 1968, How-
ard University. - Ed. 
1. Malcolm, In Health Care Policy, the Latest Word Is Fiscal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at 
E3, col. 1. 
2. A major change came with the overhaul of the Medicare payment system five years ago. 
The government established Diagnostic Related Groups, or DRGs, a system in which the prices 
Medicare would pay for almost 500 different types of illnesses and treatments was set by the 
government. Hospitals complained because these prices often did not allow them to make any 
profit. The Reagan administration also set up peer review organizations whereby some treat-
ments were approved in advance and reviewed afterward for cost containment purposes. Id. 
3. Johnson, The View on AIDS: Money Will Tell Much, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, at E24, 
col. 1. 
4. As an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association noted, "the ... final 
report contains a section that.essentially is urging nothing less than revamping some of the health 
care system in the United States." AIDS Recommendations Leave Federal Officials to Ponder: 
Where Do We Go From Here?, 260 J. A.M.A. 16 (1988). The editorial was referring to chapter 
12 of the draft final commission report which contained Admiral Watkins' personal assessment 
of the AIDS epidemic and which the full Commission ultimately reduced to two pages. 
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In June 1987, President Ronald Reagan, vowing to "send AIDS 
'the way of smallpox and polio' " 5 issued an executive order creating 
the Commission. 6 The commissioners were officially designated in 
September 19877 and ordered to submit a preliminary report to the 
President in ninety days. 8 But the Commission almost fell apart 
before it started. Reports circulated that its chair, Dr. W. Eugene 
Mayberry, chief executive officer of the Mayo Clinic, was a poor 
leader.9 First he was forced by other Commission members to oust 
Linda D. Sheaffer, a government health officer who had been ap-
pointed by Mayberry as the Commission's executive director. 10 Then 
three weeks later Dr. Mayberry, along with the Commission's vice 
chair and only staff physician, abruptly resigned without explana-
tion.11 Dr. Mayberry was immediately replaced by James D. Watkins, 
a retired admiral and former Chief of Naval Operations. 12 
To the surprise of many, under Admiral Watkins' leadership the 
Commission submitted a preliminary report to the President in De-
cember 1987 outlining its plan of action.13 After hearing testimony 
from more than 200 people, the Commission identified four critical 
issues which would be the subject of its interim report: (1) the need 
for reliable information about the incidence and prevalence of HIV; 
(2) the need for out-of-hospital patient care programs at the local level; 
(3) new drug development and availability; and (4) the problem ofsub-
stance abuse and HIV.14 Admiral Watkins' transmittal letter said that 
5. Boffey, Panel on AIDS Turns Voices of Criticism Into Songs of Praise, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 
1988, at Al, col. 1. 
6. Exec. Order No. 12,601, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129 (1987). 
7. Transmittal letter from James D. Watkins to President Reagan (Sept. 2, 1987), Interim 
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic. 
8. Exec. Order No. 12,201, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129 (1987). 
9. See, e.g., Boffey, U.S. Panel on AIDS, Citing Challenges, Ousts Staff Chief, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 15, 1987 at Al, col. 4. Another article written after the release of the final commission 
report strongly suggests that Mayberry's successor, Admiral Watkins, was a catalyst for the 
change in leadership. It was reported that Watkins expressed concern at the first commission 
meeting that no executive director had been hired, no plan of action developed, and no back-
ground information prepared for the commissioners who had known little about HIV before 
their appointment. After the meeting Watkins left for Miami, but some other commissioners met 
for dinner and talked about proposing Watkins as a replacement for Mayberry. Squires, The 
Admiral Who Took on AIDS, Wash. Post, June 20-26, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (national weekly ed.). 
10. Boffey, supra note 9. 
11. Boffey, Executive Director Named/or President's AIDS Commission, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
14, 1987, at BS, col. 2; Boffey, Panel on AIDS Turns Voices of Criticism into Songs of Praise, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Boffey, Panel on AIDS]. Later reports suggest 
that Dr. Mayberry's resignation was prompted by his realization that he could not run the Com-
mission from Minnesota. Because he spent most of his time in Minnesota and knew little about 
Washington, Commission members felt that the Commission lacked strong leadership and focus. 
Boffey, Panel on AIDS, supra. 
12. Boffey, Panel on AIDS, supra note 11. 
13. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU· 
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (Dec. 12, 1987). 
14. Id. at 17-23. There was some criticism about the Commission's focus on the prevalence 
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the four issues "cr[ied] for early resolution."15 
I. THE INTERIM REPORT 
In March 1988 the Commission submitted its interim report. 16 
That report covered only three of the four previously identified areas: 
intravenous drug abuse, patient care, and research and drug develop-
ment.17 Citing the need to curb drug abuse as "imperative to deter the 
progression of the HIV epidemic," the report called for an additional 
$1.5 billion a year for ten years to provide treatment on demand for 
intravenous drug users. 18 That sum almost equalled the Reagan ad-
ministration's total 1989 AIDS budget request for the U.S. Public 
Health Services.19 
The report also pointed out that many people believe the health 
care delivery system as currently structured and financed fails to pro-
vide adequately for the needs of people with HIV and other chronic 
illnesses. 20 This conclusion does not surprise those familiar with 
America's health care delivery system. The same concerns have been 
expressed by others, including previous presidential commissions.21 
of HIV. For example, Jeffrey Levi, executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force, thought that "[t]rying to decide the real level of AIDS-virus seroprevalence in this coun-
try is not the role of this commission. They don't have the expertise. . . . That should be left to 
scientists .•.. " AIDS Commission's Next Report Focuses on Four Critical Issues, 259 J. A.M.A. 
169-70 (1988) [hereinafter Four Critical Issues]. 
15. Four Critical Issues, supra note 14, at 169. 
16. INTERIM REPORT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY 
VIRUS EPIDEMIC (Mar. 15, 1988) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. 
17. Id. at 1. The Commission determined that it would be premature to make recommenda-
tions about the incidence and prevalence of HIV at this stage since other issues like testing, 
confidentiality, and discrimination "are closely intertwined with collecting such data." Id. 
18. Id. at 6. The report suggested that, as an interim emergency measure, minimal service or 
holding clinics may be needed. Id. at 7. It also pointed out that addicted women of childbearing 
age need programs to address their special needs. Id. The report noted that it would be difficult 
to formulate a sound policy since data on the drug abusing community is not being collected in 
any uniform manner. Id. at 12. 
19. Fineberg, The Social Dimension of AIDS. 259 SCI. AM., Oct. 1988, at 128, 132. "Total 
Federal expenditures for AIDS in fiscal 1989 are projected to exceed $2 billion" and include: 
$400 million for the Centers for Disease Control and $600 million for the National Institutes of 
Health to cover scientific research, disease surveillance, prevention, and control measures. An 
additional $600 million was requested to pay the federal share of patient care provided through 
Medicaid, but this amount should not be included in the total AIDS expenditures since it is not 
calculated in expenditure totals for other diseases like cancer. Id. 
20. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 16, at 28; see also I U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACKS AND MINORITY HEALTH 
(1985) (Executive Summary) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT ON BLACKS AND MINORITY 
HEALTH] (excessive deaths of minorities from cancer and cardiovascular disease). 
21. See, e.g .• I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED-
ICAL AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: 
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF 
HEALTH SERVICES 88, 97-98 (1983) (racial and ethnic minorities and the indigent traditionally 
have been denied access to adequate health care); A. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET (1985); SEC-
RETARY'S REPORT ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH, supra note 20, at 17-18 (more blacks 
and Hispanics than whites have no usual source of medical care). In September 1988 a panel of 
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To the surprise of many, the interim report recommended that an 
additional $1.6 billion, $924.5 million in federal funds alone, be spent 
to deal with the three areas discussed.22 A few commissioners ex-
pressed concern that government might not be willing to spend this 
kind of money, and recommended that the panel eventually prioritize 
its recommendations to guide public officials in deciding which ex-
penditures were most important.23 In justifying the large expendi-
tures, the Commission indicated that HIV-related basic research is 
expected to result in beneficial discoveries to aid in the treatment and 
cure of other diseases. 24 
The interim report estimated that implementation of its recom-
mendations would cost $2.2 billion per year. Yet a commitment to 
that level of spending seemed unlikely, given the Reagan administra-
tion's policy of reduced spending for domestic health-related pro-
grams. 25 With a growing national debt and a public set against a tax 
experts, in a 218·page report, The Future of Public Health, commissioned by the National Acad· 
emy of Sciences, "expressed 'great concern and some alarm' that the nation's public health pro-
grams had fallen into disarray." Boffey, Panel Finds U.S. Failing in Safeguarding Health, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at Bl3, col. 1. The panel concluded that there has been an "erosion of 
support, weak leadership and disorganization," but said this problem "could not be attributed to 
any one Presidential administration." The panel said that a major overhaul of the public health 
system was needed so that each state health department would have more control over all health· 
related functions. Id. 
22. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 16, at 75. The report recommended $1.5 billion for treat-
ment services ($750 million in federal funds and $750 million in state funds); $18 million in 
federal funds for treatment research; $30 million in federal funds for drug abuse prevention; and 
$126.5 million in federal funds for outreach education. Id. Specifically, the report recommended 
that $20 million federal dollars be appropriated to provide primary medical and dental care for 
persons infected with HIV. An additional $50 million in federal and matching state funds was 
recommended to assist community-based organizations develop housing and day care facilities 
and other support services for people infected with HIV. Id. at 29. A total of $25 million in 
federal and state matching funds was recommended for home health care. Id. at 30. $25 million 
was recommended for hospice or other long-term care for patients from ages twenty to forty 
since, as the Commission recognized, most long-term institutional care in this country is 
designed for the elderly. Id. at 31. $35 million was recommended for medical services for HIV-
infected infants. $20 million in federal and state funds was recommended for infant foster care 
programs; $5 million in federal funds for pediatric demonstration projects; and $10 million in 
federal funds for demonstration comprehensive family care centers in regions with a high preva-
lence of HIV infection. Id. at 30-31. 
23. Boffey, AIDS Panel Backs Wide Drive in U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at BS, col. 1. 
24. "HIV-related basic research is expected to have high yield benefits to Americans who 
suffer from cancer, viral diseases, and immune diseases, which collectively kill an estimated 
650,000 individuals each year." P. 38. 
25. For example, as the interim report points out, the problems of minority and underserved 
communities disproportionately affected by the HIV infection were made worse by the elimina-
tion of National Health Service Corps (NHSC) physician scholarships in 1981. The NHSC had 
been created in 1970 to provide primary medical care to isolated or underserved areas and to 
people who, due to economic or geographical barriers, race, language, culture, or other con-
straints, do not have access to basic health care. Most of the NHSC physicians work in Commu-
nity Health Centers, Migrant Health Centers, and Indian Health Services. The program reached 
its peak in 1986 with an enrollment of 3200 providers. Yet because the Reagan administration 
was phasing out the program, less than 100 NHSC providers will be available in 1994 compared 
to the current enrollment of2800. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 16, at 40. In addition, the new 
loan repayment plan established by Congress in 1987 is not expected to substantially alleviate the 
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increase, many doubted that the recommendations would bring about 
any meaningful change. 
II. THE FINAL REPORT 
A. Major Recommendations 
Stressing its attempt to strike the "proper balance" between soci-
ety's obligation toward diseased and nondiseased persons, the Com-
mission submitted its final report to the President on June 24, 1988. 
The report contains 600 recommendations on a wide range of topics 
- discrimination, nursing shortages, therapeutic drug development, 
intravenous drug abuse, and education. While two-thirds of the rec-
ommendations are new, the report also includes some topics covered 
in the Commission's interim report. The Commission lists its most 
important findings in the Executive Summary, emphasizing the need 
to (1) provide accessible, confidential, voluntary testing accompanied 
by "appropriate counseling"; (2) treat HIV as a disability, whose vic-
tims deserve strong legal antidiscrimination protection; (3) formulate 
stronger confidentiality standards at both the federal and state levels 
to protect those persons infected with HIV; ( 4) institute immediate 
confidential partner notification by public health officials for sexually 
transmitted diseases, including HIV, and notification of all persons 
who have received blood transfusions since 1977 that they may need to 
be tested; (5) make prevention and treatment of intravenous drug and 
alcohol abuse "a top national priority"; (6) provide drug and alcohol 
abuse education to school children; (7) provide scholarships and other 
financial assistance for nursing education; (8) expand and extend the 
National Health Services Corps and recruit more minority health pro-
fessionals; (9) give NIH greater administrative flexibility to aggres-
sively pursue biomedical research; (10) provide "more equitable and 
cost-effective financing of care for persons with HIV"; (11) provide 
health professionals with complete information about HIV, adequate 
protective materials, and a safe work environment; and (12) further 
problem, since it will create only forty new providers and return to service a number of earlier 
scholarship recipients. Id. at 40-41. 
The Reagan administration was unwilling, until very recently, to even target HIV-related 
programs to the black and Latino communities. See, e.g., Nickens, AIDS, Race, and the Law: 
The Social Construction of Disease, 12 NOVA L. REv. 1179 (1988). For example, as noted by the 
Commission, transfusion-exposed individuals, women, and children (most of whom are black 
and Latino) have generally been excluded from the HIV drug clinical trials. P. 56. ' 
As another commentator points out: 
[W]hen NIH did take up the problem of AIDS, research funding was inadequate. In 1982 
and 1983 the administration did not budget any money for AIDS research; nevertheless, 
Congress allocated $33 million. The following year, the administration asked for $39 mil-
lion. Congress appropriated $61 million. In 1986, Congress allocated $234 million, but the 
Reagan administration proposed cutting this to $213.2 million; this, despite the fact that 
cases have been doubling every year. 
Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 238 
(1986). 
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education efforts to emphasize that HIV can be transmitted heterosex-
ually (pp. xvii-xix). 
A cornerstone of the final Commission report is the recommenda-
tion to combat discrimination against those who are infected with 
HIV. According to the report: 
HIV-related discrimination is impairing this nation's ability to limit 
the spread of the epidemic. . . . Public health officials will not be able to · 
gain the confidence and cooperation of infected individuals or those at 
high risk for infection if such individuals fear that they will be unable to 
retain their jobs and their housing, and that they will be unable to obtain 
the medical and support services they need because of discrimination 
based on a positive HIV antibody test. [p. 119] 
News accounts of the report highlighted its recommendation for a new 
federal law to protect persons infected with HIV from discrimination 
in employment, housing, and health insurance.26 In the past, the Rea-
gan administration and many conservative members of Congress stiffly 
opposed extending federal antidiscrimination protection, believing 
such measures should be left to the states.27 
Another cornerstone recommendation is that new federal and state 
confidentiality laws be enacted to encourage more people to volunteer 
to be tested. 28 The Commission emphasizes voluntary as opposed to 
mandatory HIV testing as an effective means of preventing transmis-
sion of the virus, but says voluntary measures will fail without ade-
quate confidentiality laws. The recommendation on confidentiality 
stresses that identifying information obtained through HIV testing and 
counseling should only be disclosed with the written consent of the 
individual except in certain very narrowly drawn circumstances.29 
26. See, e.g., Prescriptions Aplenty to Defeat AIDS. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. June 13, 
1988, at 7; Botrey, AIDS Panel's Chief Urges Ban on Bias Against Infected, N.Y. Times, June 3, 
1988, at Al, col. 6 [hereinafter Botrey, Ban on Bias]; White House Aide Studying AIDS Comm is· 
sion Recommendations: Reports to President Soon, 260 J. A.M.A. 602 (1988) (pointing out that 
the commissioners approved the broadening and extending of antidiscrimination laws by a nar-
row 7-to-5 margin). 
The Commission rejected the notion of providing antidiscrimination protection only for per-
sons suffering with HIV infection, noting that "[f]or the long term, federal legislation which 
clearly provides comprehensive antidiscrimination protection for all persons with disabilities, in· 
cluding those with HIV infection, is needed." P. 121. The Commission recommended that 
"[t]he President ... issue an executive order banning discrimination on the basis of handicap, 
with HIV infection included as a handicapping condition." P. 121. The Commission also rec-
ommended that the federal disability laws be extended to the private sec~or. P. 123. 
27. See Botrey, Ban on Bias, supra note 26. Currently, according to Presidential advisor Dr. 
Ian MacDonald, 36 states have laws protecting people infected with HIV. Educators Fault Rea-
gan's Hesitation To Endorse Steps Against AIDS Bias, SCHOOL L. NEWS, Aug. 18, 1988, at 5. 
28. P. 126. "A federal statute that carefully balances the need for confidentiality of HIV 
information against the protection of the public health is a necessary and appropriate response to 
confidentiality concerns. . • . In addition, state model confidentiality legislation must be devel-
oped and passed as reinforcement to federal confidentiality protection." P. 126. 
29. P. 127. More specifically, disclosure would only be required (1) to "members of the 
individual's direct care giving team"; (2) to "health care workers accidentally 'exposed to the 
blood or blood contaminated body fluids' "; (3) for purposes of "statistical reports if used in such 
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Breaches of confidentiality would be classified as misdemeanors under 
the federal statute and would be punishable by fines of up to $10,000 
(p. 127). The Commission also recommends that any federal confiden-
tiality provision should not be construed as preempting any consistent 
state statute, recognizing that a number of states have enacted laws to 
protect the confidentiality of HIV test results. 30 
Both the discrimination and confidentiality recommendations are 
covered in chapter nine of the report, which is devoted to legal and 
ethical issues. In this chapter the Commission also addresses the 
criminalization of HIV transmission, and HIV transmission in the 
context of sexual assault and correctional facilities (pp. 119-40). The 
recommendation which is most disappointing for civil libertarians is 
that states enact HIV-specific statutes to punish individuals "who 
know of their status and engage in behaviors which they know are, 
according to scientific research, likely to result in transmission of HIV 
... " (p. 131). While several legal writers agree with the Commission's 
conclusion that current criminal laws are of limited value in prevent-
ing the transmission of HIV,31 there are similar disadvantages to an 
HIV-specific criminal law.32 
The report also calls for stricter enforcement of prostitution laws 
(p. 131). It lists the lenient and erratic enforcement of prostitution 
laws as an obstacle to progress, yet fails to explain how strict enforce-
ment of these laws would help stem the transmission of HIV. The 
prostitutes most frequently arrested and subjected to these laws are 
women, and medical evidence suggests that female prostitution alone, 
at least in the United States, may not be a major mode of HIV trans-
mission. 33 Several studies examining the extent to which female pros-
titutes in the United States are at increased risk of becoming infected 
with and transmitting HIV conclude that the rate of HIV infection 
among female prostitutes who are not drug users is minimal, while 
a way that no person can be identified"; (4) "to blood, organ, semen, or breast milk banks"; (5) 
"to a spouse or sexual partner when the individual will not inform such party"; (6) "by a court 
order issued pursuant to application of a state public health officer"; and (7) "to the victim of a 
sexual assault." P. 127. 
30. P. 27. See Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy 
in the United States, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 13 (1987) (citing the confidentiality 
laws of California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin). 
31. See, e.g., Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New 
Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985); Field & Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal 
Law, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 46 (1987). 
32. See generally, Field & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 54-56. 
33. The prevalence rate for HIV among female prostitutes in the U.S. ranges between zero 
and 65%, with intravenous drug use being the single most important risk factor. This compares 
to studies of female prostitutes in East Africa which found a prevalence rate of 65% which 
appears to be related only to sex. Rosenberg & Weiner, Prostitutes and AIDS: A Health Depart-
ment Priority?, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 418, 420-21 (1988); see also Antibody to Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus in Female Prostitutes, 257 J. A.M.A. 2011 (1987) [hereinafter Antibody to 
HIV]. 
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female prostitutes who also use intravenous drugs have a higher rate of 
infection. At least one writer contends that most female prostitutes 
engage in oral sex as opposed to vaginal intercourse with their custom-
ers, so that there is minimal risk that they will transmit the virus. 34 
Further, female-to-male transmission of HIV is believed to be more 
difficult than male-to-female transmission.35 
The Commission's recommendation regarding prostitution laws 
seems inconsistent with its own warning "that criminal sanctions for 
HIV transmission must be carefully drawn, must be directed only to-
ward behavior which is scientifically established as a mode of trans-
mission, and should be employed only when all other public health 
and civil actions fail to produce responsible behavior" (p. 130). Early 
in this century, social hygiene reformers and physicians assumed that 
women, especially prostitutes, were the primary transmitters of vene-
real disease.36 During World War II, prostitutes, "promiscuous" wo-
men, and even the "girl-next-door" were often portrayed in Army 
posters as the source of venereal disease.37 The Commission's recom-
mendation only perpetuates the stereotypical assumption that women 
are the chief agents of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. 
The report further recommends that criminal justice officials, 
"under the guidance of public health officials, should develop a mecha-
nism to order that a sexual offender submit to an HIV test at the earli-
est possible juncture in the criminal justice process" (p. 133). 
However, the report does not indicate whether this test is to be per-
formed at the time of arrest, later but still before conviction, or after 
conviction. This distinction is extremely important since arguably 
mandatory HIV testing prior to conviction might be unlawful infringe-
ment upon the suspect's constitutional rights.38 
Another troubling recommendation is that all convicted sex of-
fenders be tested for the HIV antibody prior to their parole hearing or 
release from prison (p. 133). Although the report indicates that a posi-
tive HIV test result should not be used as the sole basis for the 
abridgement of any right to parole or furlough (p. 135), the Commis-
34. Decker, Prostitutes os a Public Health Issue, in AIDS AND THE LA w 81, 84 (H. Dalton & 
S. Burris eds. 1987). 
35. Guinan & Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United States, 251 J. A.M.A. 
2039, 2041 (1987); Rosenberg & Weiner, supra note 33, at 421 ("Probability of spread [of HIV) 
from women to men remains unquantitated but is probably lower than that from men to wo-
men."). The risk of transmission from an infected male to a female is estimated by some to be 
0.001 per contact. Rosenberg & Weiner, supra note 33, at 421. The risk of transmission of HIV 
is further reduced by the use of condoms. 
36. A. BRANDT, supra note 21, at 92. 
37. Id. at 167-68 and plates 14, 18, 19, 20. 
38. One might argue under the fourth amendment that, absent probable cause, an HIV blood 
test would be an invasion of privacy. It is doubtful that probable cause can be established based 
on scientific evidence since even the Commission admits that no empirical data exists regarding 
the prevalence and incidence of HIV among sex offenders. Pp. 131-32. 
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sion believes that "a positive· test result should affect the degree of su-
pervision the sexual offender receives following release [from prison]" 
(p. 133). However, despite the Commission's caution, if the parole 
board has knowledge of the offender's positive test result, this informa-
tion may unduly prejudice any decision. 
The HIV crisis adds a new dimension to traditional legal problems 
like discrimination, insurance, tort liability, health care issues, and 
housing. Judging by the number of legal problems mentioned in the 
final Commission report, any law professor or student could find an 
AIDS-related topic for research in almost any area of the law.39 
B. Other Recommendations 
1. HIV Screening and Testing 
The final Commission report makes no mention of one important 
screening and testing issue - mandatory HIV antibody testing of ap-
plicants and employees by employers. However, the report, emphasiz-
ing that testing and counseling should be used primarily as a 
prevention strategy to encourage behavior change, sets forth five rea-
sons for HIV antibody testing: (1) to facilitate early clinical diagnosis 
of HIV infection; (2) to screen donated blood, organs, breast milk, and 
semen; (3) to establish incidence and prevalence data to monitor the 
epidemic; (4) to warn sexual partners of their exposure to HIV; and (5) 
to use in conjunction with counseling to encourage positive behavior 
changes (p. 73). Perhaps the Commission is silent on employer testing 
because its outlined justifications do not support the federal govern-
ment's own current practice of mandatory testing of recruits and 
members of the military, peace corps applicants, and State Depart-
ment employees and dependents. 
The Commission also hedges on whether medical authorities 
should test a patient who does not consent after being informed that a 
health care worker has been exposed to the patient's blood or blood-
contaminated bodily fluids, stating only that "[i]n the unusual case of 
denial of consent, competent medical authorities should make the de-
termination whether testing should be done and, if done, should note 
the rationale in the medical record" (p. 139). Throughout the report, 
the Commission stresses the need for informed consent and counseling 
for HIV testing, yet it fails to hold that line here on the grounds that in 
this instance the right of the health care worker to know is more im-
39. Issues one might research include liability problems related to worker safety (pp. 39-40); 
ethical issues surrounding the potential exploitation of certain groups participating in vaccine 
clinical trials, such as minority and third world populations and intravenous drug users (p. 47); 
and liability protection for manufacturers trying to develop vaccines for HIV (p. 47). See also 
Weisenhaus, The Shaping Of AIDS Law, Natl. L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1. More than 170 
AIDS-related laws have been passed by the states. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Con-
fronting AIDS, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621 (1989). 
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portant than the patient's right to privacy. Yet some hospitals, pre-
cisely because the consequences of a positive test result are so severe, 
respect the privacy and autonomy of the patient in these situations and 
simply do a base line test of the health care worker with periodic 
retests. Moreover, testing the patient at the time of the exposure to 
the health care worker will not necessarily reveal that the patient is 
infected, because there is a window period between the time of the 
patient's exposure and the time that antibodies to HIV are detectable 
by current HIV tests. Hedging on such an important question will not 
make it go away.40 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) takes a, clearer stand on HIV test-
ing and screening. In a report released simultaneously with the final 
Commission report, IOM says that mandatory HIV screening should 
be limited to blood, tissue, and organ donations.41 In fact, IOM be-
lieves that the consequences of HIV screening and testing are so seri-
ous that formalized rules and regulations are needed in addition to 
antidiscrimination and confidentiality provisions.42 On the other 
hand, the IOM calls for a conference on the ramifications of routine 
HIV antibody testing of health care workers43 and takes no position 
on mandatory testing of prisoners.44 IOM also concludes that 
"mandatory testing of prostitutes at the time of arrest or as a condition 
of release is not warranted at this time."45 Nevertheless, several cities 
and states require mandatory HIV testing of prostitutes either at the 
time of arrest or as a condition of release. 46 
Both the Commission and IOM favor reporting of positive HIV 
antibody test results to public health officials. However, the IOM is 
against mandatory reporting with identifiers, 47 whereas the Commis-
sion suggests omitting identifiers only in the context of reporting to the 
40. Kristine Gebbie, a member of the Commission, has been quoted as saying: "A lot of 
people in this country are just hoping that AIDS will quietly go away, and I'm afraid President 
Reagan is one of them." Lichtblau, Reagan Rejects Federal AIDS Anti-Bias Law, L.A. Times, 
Aug. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 4. 
41. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: 
UPDATE 1988 at 10, 75 [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988]. This report is an 
update of an earlier report, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: 
CoNFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 
(1986). 
42. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 8-9, 71-74. 
43. Id. at 15, 101. 
44. Id. at 10. 
45. Id. at 10; see id. at 78-79. 
46. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 78-79; see Antibody to HIV, 
supra note 33, at 2012 (Nevada has required monthly screening of prostitutes in licensed brothels 
and Florida has required all convicted prostitutes to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases 
including HIV); Milne, Two Detroit Judges Mandate AIDS Screening far Prostitutes, Oncology 
Times, July 1, 1987, at 16; Narvaez, Newark Moves to Test far AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 
1988, at Bl, col. 4. 
47. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 11, 82. 
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Centers for Disease Control for incidence and prevalence reasons (p. 
4). The Commission does question the Immigration and Nationaliza-
tion Service's addition in 1987 of HIV to the list of "dangerous conta-
gious diseases" justifying excluding refugees and refusing asylum 
except under extraordinary circumstances (p. 156). Rather than con-
demn the policy, however, the Commission recommends that the pol-
icy be reexamined twelve months after its implementation (p. 156). 
2. Access to Health Care/Financing Health Care 
Previously, Admiral Watkins had been critical of physicians and 
dentists who refused to care for persons infected with HIV.48 How-
ever, while the final cominission report indicates. that this problem 
continues,49 it fails to take a strong stand on this issue. Th~ Commis-
sion reaffirms that health care providers have an ethical' obligation to 
"provide care, within the limits of their competencies, to' all persons 
who need it, regardless of their HIV status" (p. 137) ----; hut this rec-
ommendation simply repeats the language of the American Medical 
Association50 and fails to point out that physicians may in some cir-
cumstances be under a legal duty to treat.51 Further, the Commission 
ignores the problem of health care providers denying nonemergency 
but critical life-sustaining treatment to individuals who lack health 
care insurance. 
As mentioned previously, a key component of the final commission 
report was that much more money needs to be spent to help stem the 
transmission ofHIV.52 The Commission admits that the epidemic has 
simply "magnified [the] flaws in the methods and mechanisms of the 
health care financing system in this country ... " (p. 141). However, it 
devotes only seven pages to the financing issue. The recommendations 
contained in chapter ten are merely stopgap measures that do not 
squarely address the real problem - an inadequately financed health 
care system which is not structured effectively to care.for .the chroni-
cally ill, the uninsured working poor, and racial/ethnic minorities, es-
pecially minority group members who also fall within one or both of 
the preceding categories. 53 
48. AIDS Policy in the Making. 239 SCIENCE 1087 (1988) (discussing Watkins' comments at 
a meeting with reporters on February 24, 1988). 
49. Pp. 136-37; see, e.g., Banks, AIDS and the Right to Health Care, 4 ISSUES IN LAW & 
MED. lSl, 1Sl-S2 (1988); Gianelli, Issue of AIDS Control vs. Civil Rights Explored at Commis-
sion Hearings, Am. Med. News, May 27, 1988, at 2, 4. 
so. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 99 (the American Medical 
Association adopted a policy statement in 1987 that "a physician 'may not ethically refuse to 
treat a patient whose condition is within the physician's current realm of competence' merely 
because the patient has AIDS or is seropositive" (citation omitted)). 
SI. See generally Banks, The Right To Medical Treatment, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra 
note 34, at 17S-81. 
S2. See supra notes 22-2S and accompanying text. 
S3. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 16, 110-11. 
1332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1321 
Once again IOM has more comprehensive recommendations to 
deal with the financing problem. Perhaps this reflects a fundamental 
difference in philosophy between IOM and the Commission. While 
the Commission is trying to "end up with a better system which will 
be more responsive, more humane, and more able to direct its manifest 
strengths quickly and efficiently to where they are most needed" (p. 
17), IOM believes "that all individuals have a right to equitable access 
to adequate medical care and that society has an ethical obligation to 
ensure such access."s4 IOM consequently recommends four principles 
to be used in developing any kind of financing strategy: (1) coverage 
should begin at the time of HIV infection; (2) special consideration 
should be given to "hard-hit" communities; (3) the public and private 
sectors should share responsibility for financing medical care; and (4) 
payment proposals should encourage "cost-effective" care. ss 
While both reports agree that more effort should be directed at 
minimizing transmission of HIV among intravenous drug users and 
their sexual and needle-sharing partners, there are significant differ-
ences. Both groups endorse the expansion of drug abuse treatment 
programs,s6 a long-term and costly strategy, but IOM additionally 
proposes some immediate intervention programs such as instruction in 
the use of bleach to sterilize drug equipment and the distribution of 
sterile needles to drug users. s7 Likewise, both reports agree that 
clinical drug trials need to be broadly available to minorities, women, 
IV drug users, and children in a wide range of geographical areas. ss 
But the Commission recommends community-based clinical trials (pp. 
56-59), while IOM favors clinical trials "within well-established sites 
for drug testing."s9 Traditionally women of child-bearing age have 
been denied access to clinical drug trials because of alleged harm to 
the reproductive system and hormonal differences between men and 
women. The blanket exclusion of women is unjustified, since male re-
productive systems can also be harmed by experimental drugs; if there 
are hormonal differences between women and men, separate trials for 
S4. Id. The IOM report states: 
The problems of financing care for persons with AIDS and other HIV-related conditions 
reflect the inequities in the entire U.S. health care system in relation to the uninsured and 
uninsurable, the plight of the poor in getting care, continuing underfunding for disease pre-
vention, insufficient capabilities for care outside of institutions, and inadequate care for the 
chronically ill. 
Id.; see also id. at 110-11. 
SS. Id. at 17, 118. 
S6. Seep. 9S; see also CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 12, 84. 
S7. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 12, 8S-87. 
S8. See pp. S4-S9; CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 136-40. 
S9. CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 140. IOM believes that 
"[c]ommunity-based trials need to be carefully supervised to yield useful results" and should be 
used only at the final phase of the trials. Id. 
May 1989] AIDS and Government 1333 
women are a more appropriate response. 60 
C. Government's Response to the Epidemic 
In February 1988, shortly before the release of the interim report, 
Admiral Watkins admitted in a meeting with reporters that the Rea-
gan administration had not developed a national policy for AIDS. 61 
Neither the interim nor the final commission report contains criticism 
of the Reagan administration. Critical references to the Reagan ad-
ministration in the final draft that Admiral Watkins submitted to the 
Commission were deleted when the final version was supmitted to the 
White House.62 Nevertheless, criticism of some units of the federal 
government appear in several sections of the report.63 Few would 
deny that to date many states have been much more deeply involved in 
60. COMMITIEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIQNS, AIDS DRUGS: WHERE ARE THEY?, 
H.R. REP. No. 1092, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1988). 
61. AIDS Policy in the Making, supra note 48. He suggested that the Commission was devel-
oping a policy. 
62. The chapter of the draft report entitled, "Guidance for the Future: The Establishment of 
a Public Health Emergency System Within the Federal Government," contained the following 
language which is not found in the final version: 
The Federal Government has not yet established a unified comprehensive discrete policy in 
response to the HIV epidemic. Rather, various policy statements and individual department 
policies have emerged throughout the Federal Government, and mostly in relation to ongo-
ing activities within the agencies or circumscribed aspects of the epidemic. 
The bureaucratic procedures of the Federal Government have acted as an impediment to· 
a timely response to the HIV epidemic. Agency requests for increased personnel, facilities 
and funding have been repeatedly thwarted, leaving many agencies to respond by stealing 
personnel and resources from other functions. Many of the decisions about the Federal 
response the [sic] the HIV epidemic appear to have been made on the basis of criteria other 
than medical and scientific data about the needs of persons with HIV infection and AIDS or 
future projections about the epidemic. Rather, in some instances bottom line personnel ceil-
ings and overall Government target budget figures appear to have driven the Federal Gov-
ernment's response to the epidemic. Quick decisions based on n·ewly discovered facts about 
the HIV epidemic have been virtually impossible. 
The commission is deeply concerned about the Federal Government's slow response to 
the HIV epidemic and believes that it is incumbent upon the Federal Government and the 
Congress to establish a public health emergency response mechanism for the future. With 
such a mechanism in place, the Federal Government would have the capacity to shift gears 
and move immediately into an emergency mode which would allow for quick decisions and 
a capacity to respond to emerging data and knowledge in a timely fashion, thus preventing 
unnecessary loss of life. 
Excerptsfrom Report by AIDS Panel Chairman, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1988, at Al6, col. 3; cf ch. 
12, "Guidance for the Future," in the final commission report at p. 157. 
63. For a sampling of these criticisms, see p. 34 ("The Department of Labor should move 
expeditiously to develop a permanent and enforceable standard covering blood-borne diseases"; 
p. 41 ("[A]s stated in the Commission's interim report, a greater sense of urgency throughout the 
government is needed to implement the increased .funds already approved by Congress and to 
supplement improvements already underway .... "); p. 66 ("CDC has lagged behind scientific 
understanding by not moving to an HIV infection-based data collection system when the an-
tibody test was developed in 1985 to detect infection in asymptomatic persons"); p. 69 ("OMB 
should not undermine congressional intent"); p. 120 ("There is a lack of coordinated leadership 
from our public and private institutions on the issue of discrimination against persons with HIV 
infection .... Enforcement of existing anti-discrimination laws is slow and ineffective."). 
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the development of AIDS legislation and policies than has the federal 
government. 
IOM also criticizes the uneven federal response and "the absence 
of strong federal leadership" in the fight against HIV. 64 However, 
IOM commends Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's efforts to fight 
the epidemic.65 Its report also calls for strong federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws to protect persons infected with HIV and encourage them to 
seek treatment. 66 IOM echoes the Commission's concern that educa-
tional efforts should be effectively targeted to racial and ethnic minori-
ties who are at great risk of infection. 67 
Another controversial recommendation by Admiral Watkins 
which was not included in the final commission report was that the 
President designate the Surgeon General as the federal government's 
principal spokesperson in health care emergencies and give him au-
thority to develop effective public policy in a speedy fashion. 68 The 
final version of the report favors "some special management oversight 
entity" to be responsible for seeing that an action plan is carried out. 69 
The Commission also recommends establishing an independent federal 
Department of Health.70 IOM, on the other hand, reaffirms its 1986 
recommendation that a national commission on HIV infection and 
AIDS be established to assume a clearly spelled-out advisory role. 11 
Ill. THE GOVERNMENT'S REsPONSE To THE REPORT 
Instead of endorsing the Commission's recommendations immedi-
ately, President Reagan appointed White House drug policy advisor 
Dr. Ian MacDonald to develop a course of action within thirty days. 72 
Ulti_mately, the President set forth a ten-point action plan that stopped 
64. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 24-25. See generally R. SHILTS, 
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: PoLmCS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987); s. PANEM, 
THE AIDS BUREAUCRACY (1988), for a more detailed discussion of the government's response 
to the HIV epidemic. 
65. CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 24. 
66. Id. at 6, 62-64. 
67. Id. at 67-68. • 
68. Boffey, Ban on Bias, supra note 26, at Al6, col. 3. 
69. P. 157. The Commission sets up a two-pronged management system: an external seven-
person committee responsible for ongoing evaluation, and a single designated official to mannge 
the implementation of the report Within existing government structures. P. 158. At least one 
news article characterized Admiral •Watkins' proposal as creating an "AIDS cznr." Trnfford & 
Thompson, The Muddled State of AIDS Policy, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1988, at 16 (Health). Inter-
estingly, the other Commission members rejected the concept of an AIDS cznr - but Congress 
subsequently created a "drug cznr."· See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
70. P. 158. The Commission also recommends that chief health officials have expanded pow-
ers in times of public health emergencies. 
71. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 24-26. The commission would 
have a five-year, renewable term. Id. at 25. 
72. Johnson, Report by AIDS Panel Gets Muted Reaction by Reagan, N.Y. Times June 28, 
1988, at A16, col. 1. 
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short of adopting the Commission's recommendations on antidis-
crimination protection for persons with HIV. Instead he ordered fed-
eral agencies to adopt guidelines to prevent dis.crimination in the 
workplace against persons with HIV and directed the Attorney Gen-
eral to "conduct an expeditious review" of the Commission's antidis-
crimination recommendations. 73 
The Justice Department, following the Commission's recommen-
dation (p. 123), subsequently issued a legal opinion reversing its earlier 
1986 memorandum on the application of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 (as amended)74 to persons infected with HIV.75 The 
new memorandum follows the reasoning of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 76 
The President also called upon schools and businesses to "examine 
and consider adopting education and personnel policies" using the 
guidelines prepared by the federal Office of Personnel Management 
and Centers for Disease Control. 77 However, this attempt to, in effect, 
extend federal HIV workplace policy to the private sector was criti-
cized for being less effective than the executive order recommended by 
the Commission. 78 
The President's ten-point program also ordered: (1) the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to set up conferences on AIDS 
public health issues; (2) the Food and Drug Administration to im-
prove the procedures and accuracy of HIV blood tests; (3) accelerated 
development, approval, and distribution of vaccines and treatments; 
and ( 4) accelerated approval of AIDS budget requests. All of these 
measures were recommended by the Commission. The President 
avoided addressing the Commi!ision's recommendation on increasing 
the number of drug treatment centers to facilitate treatment on de-
mand, but Congress subsequently appropriated money for the con-
struction of drug treatment centers. That drug bill also contained a 
provision which allows the death penalty for certain drug-related 
73. Johnson, Reagan, Spuming Tougher Move, Orders Anti-Bias Rules on AIDS. N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 1. "Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Los Angeles), chairman of a House 
subcommittee on health, accused the Administration of 'stalling' and said: 'We don't need an-
other study.' " Lichtblau, supra note 40, at 12. 
74. 29 u.s.c. 794 (1982). 
75. Shenon, Protection for U.S. Workers With AIDS is Widened, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1988, at 
A17, col. 1. 
76. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
77. Johnson, supra note 73, at BS, col. 2. 
78. Although Leslye Arsht, a White House spokesperson, indicated that the President's ac-
tions had "exactly the same force" as an executive order, opponents contend that an executive 
order has symbolic weight and would have to be formally amended or overruled by a subsequent 
administration. The President's directive has no such staying power, and could simply be ig-
nored. Id. 
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murders. 79 The Commission recommended harsher penalties for both 
sellers and buyers of drugs as a "realistic deterrent to drug abuse," but 
only mentioned "stiffer sentences, larger fines, and forfeiture of assets 
derived from drug trafficking" (p. 102). 
In October 1988 Congress passed the first comprehensive AIDS 
bill. 80 The measure included legislation on HIV testing, research, and 
education. 81 Confidentiality of HIV test results had to be sacrificed to 
ensure passage, but the bill does call for anonymous testing. 82 Con-
gress appropriated $1.5 billion for programs that follow many of the 
recommendations of the Commission. 83 
CONCLUSION 
William A. McNeill, relating the devastating impact that smallpox 
had upon the Aztec Indians, 84 writes that the psychological implica-
tions of a disease, which "killed only Indians and left Spaniards un-
harmed," enabled the Spaniards to prevail, not only militarily, but 
culturally over the more numerous Aztecs. 85 His book concludes that 
infectious diseases invading virgin populations are "capable of destroy-
ing or crippling entire human communities .... "86 
Today the United States and many other countries have been in-
vaded by a new deadly infectious disease, HIV. It remains to be seen 
whether this country will allow the HIV epidemic to destroy the vast 
network of civil rights and liberties laboriously developed over the 
79. Mohr, Drog Bill Passes, Finishing Business of JOOth Congress, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, 
at Al, col. 6. 
80. Molotsky, Congress Passes Compromise AIDS Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at Al2, 
col. 1. 
81. Id. The monies are to be spent for HIV prevention programs; to develop care and treat-
ment networks, and accelerate research efforts. Included along with the AIDS measures was a 
measure to alleviate the shortage of nurses. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. Specifically, over the next two years $100 million per year will be spent on testing 
and the same amount will be spent for home health care for people with AIDS. Over the next 
three years $285-300 million a year will be spent for research and $250-300 million per year will 
be spent for education. Id. 
84. W. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 1-2 (1976). 
85. Id. at 2. 
86. Id. at 13. According to Dr. Allan M. Brandt, noted medical historian: 
The manner in which a society responds to a disease, and especially to those in need, 
reveals very deep and fundamental cultural and social values. A disease is shaped not only 
by its biological qualities, but by its cultural variables as well. A disease can become a 
symbol for ordering and explaining various aspects of human experience. Medicine and 
science are not only affected by social, economic, and political variables; medicine and sci-
ence are, in fact, embedded in them . 
• • . . Until we more fully recognize the ways in which social and cultural values and 
attitudes shape medical, scientific and public health problems, it will be difficult for us to 
deal with a problem as complex as AIDS in an effective and humane way. 
Brandt, Historical Analogies to the AIDS Epidemic, in AIDS AND PATIENT MANAGEMENT: 
LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 159, 163 (M. Witt ed. 1986). 
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years to protect the outsiders of society from the tyranny of govern-
ment and a fickle and fearful majority, or whether the epidemic will 
result in a more equitable health care delivery system. 
While the report is not perfect, it is a beginning for President Bush. 
At the very least, the report probably prodded Congress to take more 
decisive steps in stemming the spread of HIV. Perhaps over the next 
four years, when approximately 365,000 people may become infected 
with HIV, America really will become a "kinder, gentler nation," at 
least toward people with HIV. 
